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Abstract
This paper shows that individual risk-type uncertainty can prevent reforms of the insurance
system that would benefit the majority of individuals. We consider the case where a subset of
the population is uncertain of their risk type and contrast two insurance regimes; the status
quo of mandated pooling of all risk types and the reform proposal being insurance with
risk-type separation over time, using Bayesian updating. Most individuals would benefit from
the reform since their risk type is better than the average but the reform does not occur due to
individual uncertainty.
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1. Introduction 
It is common to observe some pooling of risk types in insurance whenever there is some state involvement 
and most OECD countries rely heavily on the public sector to provide insurance (Hindriks and De Donder 
2003). Oftentimes, it is puzzling to observe that political demand does not effect a system change since a 
majority of the insured subsidizes a minority thereof.  
This analysis shows that individual uncertainty can prevent a reform of the insurance system which would 
result in the majority of the insured being better off. We consider three risk types of which only one is 
certain of its type. The intermediate risk type cannot distinguish its own position from that of the worst 
risk type and vice versa. We reveal that this intermingling is a stand-alone argument against the reform 
taking place. In the reform setting, (i) insurance contracts start with a premium equal to the average loss 
probability, (ii) contract renewals are undertaken after each period and mirror the individual’s loss history 
up to that point in time in a rational manner, and (iii) the individual’s loss history is public knowledge. 
This contribution is motivated by reality. An exemplary setting, whose facts may be better understood by 
the  analysis  put  forth,  can  be  sketched  as  follows:  Consider  the  regulation  of  sick  leave  payment  in 
Germany. In conceptualizing sick leave payment as insurance by the employer, individualized policies 
ought to appear in wages reflecting the risk types of employees. However, employers have a limited ability 
to determine wages according to the risk type.
1 Thus, if all employees obtain 100 percent of their wages in 
the event of sick leave, it is presumably mirrored by a pooled premium which employers subtract from 
wages across the board. In 1996, the German government reduced the mandated level of sick leave pay 
from 100 to 80 percent. This would have introduced income variability which could have been overcome 
by private insurance contracts. These private contracts could have entailed individualized premiums, since 
the employee and the insurer could have taken advantage of common experience. However, labor unions 
in many industries prevented this from happening. Unions traded in many employee benefits at the level of 
the Tarifvertrag to prevent the reform from becoming effective, i.e. employers promised to maintain the 
sick leave pay level in exchange for being able to scrap several employee amenities. Supposing that the 
unions indeed represent the interests of employees, this implies that the group of employees preferred the 
pooled premium to the at least partially individualized premium. This is surprising since the available data 
suggests that the insurance that is implied by the sick leave payment regulation is advantageous for a 
relatively slim minority of the employed.
2 The consequence of the obliged pooling is a considerable cross 
subsidization. 
Let us briefly elaborate on the related literature. Hindriks (2001) considers a similar question, that is, 
under what conditions is a uniform public insurance preferable for a majority of the insured cohort 
when compared to private insurance. However, the interest of our paper is markedly different. For 
instance, whereas in his setting, individuals might opt out of private insurance, which has an adverse 
impact on those who continue to demand insurance, all individuals are insured in both regimes in our 
setting. Also, whereas in his setting, type-specific private insurance follows from varying coverage 
rates  and  premiums,  all  individuals  are  insured  with  the  same  coverage  in  both  regimes  in  our   2 
framework.
3 Moreover, our study is related to Watt and Vazquez (1997), who compare the relative 
desirability  of  insurance  that  makes  use  of  Bayesian  updating  when  compared  to  the  one-period 
contracts that result in the separating equilibrium of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). They model two 
risk types and can show that there exist conditions under which all insured strictly prefer the full 
insurance making usage of the updating process. Finally, Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) originated the 
idea that individual uncertainty concerning a personal characteristic can act as an obstacle to reforms. 
Their application concerns the trade context, while our paper presents an application to the insurance 
context.  
In the next section, we present the general setting. Subsequently, the respective systems are described and 
evaluated from the individual’s stance. 
2. The General Setting  
Individual preferences are described by a vNM utility function U, with U’>0, U’’<0. Exogenous income 
is W. Income available in a specific state is conditional upon the insurance coverage α, which is uniform 
across all individuals, and the occurrence of a monetary loss K.
 All individuals are insured as there is an 
obligation to  enter  into  a  contract.  Individuals  suffer  at  most  one loss  per  period.  The  risk  type  i  is 
identified by the loss probability pi, i=a,b,c, with pa > pb > pc. We assume that individuals of type c are 
certain of their type, whereas individuals of type a and b can only tell that they are not type c. Individuals 
have influence on neither the loss probability nor the extent of the loss. The share of group i is λi. The 
cohort is mainly composed of risk types b and c,  c c b l l l > > +
2
1
. The insurer initially only knows the 
respective shares and loss probabilities of the risk types. The occurrence of losses is observed by both 
insurers and insured. This enables the insurer to update type probabilities over time. Since losses are 
publicly observable, there are no informational differences among insurers or between the insurer and the 
insured with regards to the loss experience.
4  
Insurance policies are actuarially fair in both systems. In the status quo, the government mandates that the 
premium must be the same across all individuals, whereas the reform enables insurers to incorporate all 
the relevant information.
5  
3. The Status Quo and the Reform 
3.1 Status Quo 
The premium is given by α p K, where p is the average loss probability. 
c c b b a a p p p p l l l + + =   (1) 
Note that the mandate of equal premiums across all individuals rules out that insurers vary coverage. The 
expected utility with z renewals of the same one-period contract and γ as discount factor is equal to 
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for individuals of types a and b.  
We assume that c b a p p p p > > >  holds. Consequently, the status quo features a cross-subsidization from 
types b and c to type a.
6 The status quo does not incentivize individuals to learn about their type so that, 
for positive learning costs, type-uncertain individuals choose to remain ignorant. 
3.2 The Reform 
Let us now detail the approximation of the risk type. Every period is an opportunity for the insurer to learn 
about the risk type of an insured. At the beginning of the first period, the insurance companies know the 
shares and the loss probabilities of risk types. After the first period, the probability of an individual to be 
of a specific type can be updated. Each further period allows another observation about the risk type. The 
information is used in the renewal of the policy at the end of each period. The Bayesian rule for the case of 




























giving  the  probability  that  the  individual  at  hand  who  has  a  loss  history  (s,n)  is  of  risk  type  i.  The 
probability  ) , ( n s i l  converges to 1 as n goes to infinity when the individual is in fact of type i (Watt and 
Vazquez 1997) and determines the premium payable for the following period. In general, after n periods 
have elapsed, s  Î [0,n], so that these n+1 possible states of the world need to be considered in the 
formation of expected utility. An insured with experience (s, n) will be charged p(s,n) α K for the next 
period with p(s,n), being the updated loss probability, calculated as follows 
c c b b a a p n s p n s p n s n s p ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( l l l + + =  
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The insurance becomes more expensive with more losses, whereas a longer duration with given losses 
lowers the premium. 
Individuals of type c have perfect knowledge of their loss probability. Individuals consider a time horizon 
of z+1 periods. Since there is a renewal of the contract after the passing of each period, z accords with the 
number of contract renewals. The number z is to be distinguished from the number n, where the latter 
denotes the number of periods that have passed when a renewal is undertaken. This leads to expected 
utility of   4 
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The other risk types only know that they are not of type c and therefore form expectations over the 
expected utilities of risk types a and b, respectively. 
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There are two major differences of the reform regime to the status quo. Firstly, there is added uncertainty. 
After  n  periods,  there  are  n+1  possible  states  of  the  world  with  significantly  diverse  income  levels. 
Secondly, there is redistribution. The passing of time allows accumulating information, which is used to 
fine-tune type probability  ) , ( n s i l . The updated loss probability p(s,n) uses  ) , ( n s i l  to approximate the 
risk-type loss probability over time, as a consequence of which the reception or the payment of a subsidy 
by the individual phases out. 
4. The Comparison 
Individuals  are  in  favor  of  the  reform  if  it  increases  their  expected  utility.  Hence,  given  individual 
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The reform is accepted if a majority of insured is in favor.  
 
Proposition: There are reasonable circumstances as to, inter alia, the discount factor, risk aversion and 
loss probabilities, in which a majority of individuals would benefit from the reform ex post, but oppose it 
due to individual risk type uncertainty ex ante. 
 
To validate this proposition, it is necessary to relate Aa,b to Ab. Given circumstances in which Ac is positive 
and Aa negative, the reform hinges on the vote of individuals of type b. If Ab is positive but Aa,b is negative, 
individual uncertainty alone prevents the reform. We will first show that Aa and Aa,b are always negative 
and then discuss effects on Ab and Ac.  
Individuals of type a lose from the uncertainty and the redistribution implied by the reform. We briefly 
illustrate  the  second  aspect.  For  the  insurance  company  to  make  zero  profits,  the  average  expected 
premium has to be the same independent of the system. After the first period, this means that   5 
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Rearranging (10) leads to  
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(11) 
This shows that the change in expected premiums for the different types sum up to zero. The term (11) 
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The term (p-pa)/(1-p) < 0 depicts the difference in expected premium in the status quo versus that in the 
reform system for type a. Individuals of type a, in addition to higher expected premium payments, have to 
put up with added uncertainty. Thus, Aa is always negative. 
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shows that, given individual uncertainty, the expected premium of types a and b is higher in the reform 
regime.  Since  type  c  individuals  gain  from  lower  expected  premiums,  the  right-hand  side  of  (14)  is 
negative, the hypothetical type a, b pays higher expected premiums. Again, the uncertainty provides a 
further reason for Aa,b being negative.  
It can be shown that individuals of type c will obtain a larger expected utility in the reform regime than in 
the status quo if the number of renewals z and the discount factor is sufficiently high (proof available upon 
request).  
In sum, it is certain for individuals of type a to lose in the reform regime, whereas the benefit of type c 
individuals is secured within specific parameter ranges. Individuals who do not know their type but mix 
expected utilities of type a and b individuals will oppose the reform since Aa,b is negative. What we do not 
yet know is whether risk type b would be in favour of the reform if they knew their type, i.e., the sign of 
Ab. The reasoning for this group is more difficult. Individuals of type b can be overrated as well as 
underestimated in relation to their true loss probability. To test our proposition and present tangible factors 
of influence on such an outcome, we present a small simulation.  
Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion and Constant Relative Risk Aversion
7   6 
Suppose 
y x x U = ) ( , ( ) 1 , 0 Î y , and pa=.8, pb=.4, pc=.1, λa=.4= λc, and λb=.2, so that p=.44.
8 We consider z ≤ 
30. For instance, to refer back to the case of sick leave pay, it is reasonable to assume that the average 
employee has at least 30 work periods, available for approximating the type. 
Result concerning the proposition for  Case  W  K  α  γ 
y=.5  y=.1 
(1a)  5  1  1  .9  Ab >0 for z=1+  Ab >0 for z=1+ 
(1b)  5  1  .5  .9  Ab >0 for z=1+  Ab >0 for z=1+ 
(1c)  5  1  .5  .85  Ab >0 for z=1+  Ab >0 for z=1+ 
(1d) 
Increases by 
.1 starting at 5 
Increases by 
.1 starting at 1  
.5  .9  Ab >0 for z=1+  Ab >0 for z=1+ 
   
Table 1. DARA/CRRA 
Since Ab is always positive, the proposition finds support in the cases given in Table 1. If we were to 
reduce the gap between pb and p, this would make the reform proposal less appealing. However, with a 
sufficient planning horizon, i.e. z being large, the reform proposal still gains support from individuals 
whom are known to be of type b.  
Constant Absolute Risk Aversion and Increasing Relative Risk Aversion 
Suppose 
x e x U
r - - =1 ) (   and  pa=.8,  pb=.4,  pc=.1,  λa=.4,  λb=.2,  and  λc=.4,  so  that  p=.44.  
Result concerning the proposition for  Case  W  K  α  γ 
ρ=1.5  ρ=2 
(2a)  5  1  1  .9  Ab >0 for z=13+   Ab >0 for z=27+  
(2b)  5  1  .5  .9  Ab >0 for z=1+   Ab >0 for z=6+  
(2c)  5  1  .5  .85  Ab >0 for z=1+   Ab >0 for z=6+  
(2d) 
Increases by 
.1 starting at 5 
Increases by 
.1 starting at 1  
.5  .9  Ab >0 for z=5+  Ab >0 for z=13+  
 
 
Table 2. CARA/IRRA 
The increase in the risk aversion shows a marked negative effect on the attractiveness of the reform since 
the uncertainty obtains more importance in the trade-off between redistribution benefits against added 
uncertainty in the reform regime. 
5. Conclusion 
We considered the prospects of a reform proposal that makes the majority of insured better off ex post. 
The framework used is one of an insured cohort made up of three different risk types who were given the 
freedom to switch from the status quo to a reform regime. The status quo is insurance with mandated 
pooling of risk types, whereas insurance with risk separation, via a learning process, is the prospect. It is   7 
proven that individual uncertainty is a stand-alone factor, which can prevent the implementation of the 
reform. 
This analysis was undertaken in light of empirical evidence indicating that the situation depicted reflects 
reality in that there is pooling in many areas of public intervention and there is learning of the risk type 
based on loss experience in private insurance markets. This study pointed to the importance of individual 
type uncertainty when individuals compare the merits of alternative regimes. A next step on the research 
agenda might be to identify possibilities to ameliorate the effects of individual uncertainty. One avenue 
seems to be the accumulation of individual loss information prior to any vote, allowing individuals to 
better deduce individual consequences of the system change. Such mechanisms will be of importance 
specifically if the reforms prevented by individual type uncertainty have a bearing on efficiency.  
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Notes 
                                                 
1 For instance, many employers in Germany face a minimum level of pay mandated by the respective Tarifvertrag, which 
practically inhibits the allowance of premium deductions from the wage in the case of high risk employees.  
2 See for reference on statistics of sick employees, e.g. Betriebskrankenkassen (2003). 
3 The fundamental information asymmetry concerning the loss probabilities underlying pooling in insurance markets can 
be tackled, for instance, by offering a menu of contracts with differing indemnity levels designed to induce the insured to 
reveal her true risk type by choice (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). Alternatively, one may utilize self-selection by means of   8 
                                                                                                                                                                      
long-term commitment. For example, Dionne and Lasserre (1985) show how, with full commitment, multi-period 
contracts can eliminate the inefficiency due to adverse selection.  
4 Consequently, there is no advantage for the current insurer to share experience with an insured as in Kunreuther and 
Pauly (1985) or for the insured to hide losses in order to influence the updating process as in Hosios and Peters (1989). 
5 In Germany, for instance, private health insurance providers are mandated by law to charge the premium irrespective of 
the personal loss experience. 
6 This description depicts the statistics of the labor market motivation described above. 
7 In all our observations of this and the following subsection, we obtain what we show formally above, that is, Ac being 
positive from the start, whereas Aa and Aa,b are always negative. 
8 The loss probabilities could also be lowered without changing the effects as long as the relative differences are reflected 
as above, e.g. with pa=.4, pb=.1, pc=.05, λa=.4, λb=.2, and λc=.4, so that p=.2, results as those in Table 1 emerge. 